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We study the effects of abolishing estate taxation in a quantitative and realistic framework that includes
the key features that policy makers are worried about: business investment, borrowing constraints,
estate transmission, and wealth inequality. We use our model to estimate effective estate taxation.
We consider various tax instruments to reestablish fiscal balance when abolishing estate taxation. We
find that abolishing estate taxation would not generate large increases in inequality, and would, in
some cases, generate increases in aggregate output and capital accumulation. If, however, the resulting
revenue shortfall were financed through increased income or consumption taxation, the immensely
rich, and the old among those in particular, would experience a welfare gain, at the cost of welfare
losses for the vast majority of the population.
Marco Cagetti
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System




Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago




Since its introduction in 1916 the estate tax has been one of the most contro-
versial taxes in the United States tax code.
The estate tax opponents call it the “death tax”. Among the legislators
supporting the abolition of the estate tax, representative Ron Paul (14th dis-
trict of Texas) states: “The estate tax is immoral and counter-productive. ...
My oﬃce has received hundreds of letters and emails from individuals and
small business owners in my district. Theses people are not rich, but they
have worked hard and saved to create an inheritance for their children...” Sen-
ator Patty Murray, from Washington State, states “I believe that we need to
repeal the estate tax. It is bad for businesses. It’s bad for workers and new job
creation.” President George W. Bush shares this view “The death tax results
in unfair double taxation of income and it hurts America’s small businesses,
which are the engine of job creation.”
The estate tax supporters see the estate tax as an extremely progressive
tax and a very eﬀective eﬀective way to tax the richest (and dead) few. Rep-
resentative Bart Stupak (1st district of Michigan) states “I have continuously
supported reforming the estate tax, but a complete repeal is ﬁscally irrespon-
sible, and serves to beneﬁt only mega multi-millionaires while harming our
economy...”. Former Senator Tom Daschle, South Dakota adds “Do we really
have to protect the billionaires? We are talking about the richest 2%.” The
estate tax supporters thus seem to believe that reducing estate taxation is a
“Paris Hilton Beneﬁt Tax Act,” meaning that reduced estate taxes only ben-
eﬁt the heiresses and heirs of the largest fortunes in the country, rather than
beneﬁting small entrepreneurs and family businesses. They also point out that
the abolition of the “death tax” would imply replacing a tax on few rich and
2dead people with a “birth tax” on all citizens.
This paper studies the eﬀects of abolishing estate taxation using a model
that explicitly studies entrepreneurial entry, continuation decisions, investment
and job creation, and transmission of estates across generations. While cali-
brated to match some other key aspects of the data, this framework matches
the observed wealth inequality and wealth mobility for both entrepreneurs and
workers, and replicates the observed consumption inequality.
We use our framework to provide a measure of eﬀective estate taxation
by matching aggregate estate taxes paid as a fraction of output and the frac-
tion of estates that pay estate taxes. Given that our model provides such a
good ﬁt of observed net worth holdings, we argue that this is a good way to
measure eﬀective estate taxation. We ﬁnd that the current statutory estate
taxation code implies a large eﬀective exemption level (about 5 million dol-
lars per household), and a fairly low eﬀective marginal tax rate (16%). These
numbers are consistent with people rationally using legal exemptions, special
provisions, and favorable valuation methods to lower the estate tax burden,
and with previous estimates which used various other methods to estimate
the schedule for the eﬀective estate tax (see Gale, Hines and Slemrod for an
overview [17]). They are also consistent with previous arguments according to
which the exemption level is high enough to imply that the impact of estate
taxes on family farms and businesses is not a major concern for most estates
(see for example Harl [24] and Gale and Slemrod [19]).
We use our calibrated model to evaluate the aggregate and distributional
eﬀects of abolishing estate taxation. We compute the steady states before and
after abolishing estate taxes, and the transition path of the economy between
steady states. We consider alternative ﬁscal policies to reestablish ﬁscal bal-
ance when estate taxation is eliminated. First, we allow the government to
3cut government spending. Since government spending is unproductive in our
framework, this should be the the scenario that is most favorable for abolish-
ing estate taxes. Second, the government increases the tax on consumption.
Third, the government increases the tax on total income.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of these policies on long-run inequality (both in
terms of consumption and wealth) is small.
In contrast, the steady state aggregate eﬀects on output and capital are
positive and signiﬁcant, compared to the small revenue raised by the estate
and gift taxes (which is about 0.3% of GDP) when either government spending
is cut, or when the tax rate on consumption is increased. Under those policies,
aggregate output goes up by 1%-1.5%, while aggregate capital increases by
2.5%. The aggregate eﬀects are instead much smaller when the tax rate on
total income is increased. Even if the income tax increase required to make
up for the shortfall in estate taxes is very small, this increased tax burden
decreases the return from running a business. The majority of entrepreneurs
would hence run their productive technologies on a smaller scale, which would
imply smaller gains in aggregate output and capital.
These reforms have signiﬁcant distributional implications. Looking at the
welfare implications for the individual households, unsurprisingly the reform in
which wasteful government spending is cut, is the reform that casts abolishing
estate taxation in the most favorable light. In that case, increased investment
by the entrepreneurs increases capital, and hence wages. Wages are the largest
source of income for most of the population, therefore most of the households
experience a welfare gain from this reform. The super-rich, and especially the
old, beneﬁt from the reduction in estate taxation. The rich who were below
the estate taxation threshold before the reform, however, loose, because they
receive a large fraction of income as capital income, and the interest rate goes
4down due to the increase in entrepreneurial savings and aggregate capital.
About 80% of the young and 90% of the old households beneﬁt from this re-
form, with an average welfare gain of the order or 0.2% of yearly consumption.
The reforms in which either the consumption or the income tax is raised
to make up from the budget shortfall from abolishing estate taxation, instead,
generate small welfare costs (of at most 1% of yearly consumption) for the
vast majority of the population, while generating sizeable welfare gains for the
richest few, and for the richest old in particular (on the order of 6% of yearly
consumption). The average welfare costs of these reforms are about 0.2-0.3%
of yearly consumption.
Our results thus suggest that most households alive today would ﬁnd in
their interest to oppose a reform in which a consumption or income tax were
raised to compensate for decreased revenues from abolishing estate taxation.
To the best of our knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst work that evaluates
estate taxation reforms by using a quantitative, general equilibrium model
that takes into account the eﬀects of the reforms on the key channels that
most worry legislators: wealth inequality, business activity, aggregate activity
at large, and estate transmission, and that quantitatively matches a number
of important features of the data, including wealth inequality.
Our ﬁndings are based on a life-cycle model with perfect altruism across
generations and period-by-period occupational choice. Some households have
the ability to employ capital and labor more productively than others, and po-
tential and existing entrepreneurs face borrowing constraints because contracts
are imperfectly enforceable.
This framework builds on Cagetti and De Nardi [11] by allowing the en-
trepreneurs to hire workers, by introducing progressive income and estate tax-
ation, proportional consumption taxation, and by computing the transition
5paths of the economy in response to tax changes1.
Despite the relevance of estate taxation reforms and its big impact in the
policy circles, few papers study it in the context of quantitative models capable
of matching the extreme concentration of wealth observed in the data. This
is because constructing such a model, computing it, and calibrating it to the
data are not easy tasks (see Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull [38] and Cagetti and De
Nardi [12] for a discussion.)
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [13] and Laitner [30] are excep-
tions in that they study estate taxation in the context of quantitative models
that are, to some extent, capable of matching the extreme concentration of
wealth observed in the data. Neither of these papers, however, model en-
trepreneurial business formation, job creation, and investment, which, accord-
ing to many legislators, is a a key channel aﬀected by estate taxation.
Further supporting the importance of explicitly modeling entrepreneurship,
previous literature has shown that entrepreneurship is a key determinant of
investment, saving, wealth holdings, and wealth inequality (See Quadrini and
R´ ıos-Rull [39], Quadrini [36] and [37], Gentry and Hubbard [20], and Cagetti
and De Nardi [11]), and is important to evaluate the eﬀects of some income
tax reforms (Meh [34], Kitao [27]).
Section 2 provides a brief overview of estate taxation in the United States.
Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 discusses our calibration procedure.
Section 5 evaluates the ﬁt of our model against a number of important features
of the data that we do not match by construction. Section 6 evaluates the
eﬀects of abolishing estate taxation while using various instruments to re-
establish ﬁscal balance, and section 7 concludes.
1See Conesa and Krueger [14] for an earlier example computing the economy’s transition
path in a Beweley model.
62 A brief overview of estate taxation in the
United States
Among the most recent literature Gale, Hines, and Slemrod [17], Aaron and
Gale [1], and Gale and Perozek [18] provide overviews and discussions on estate
and gift taxation. Here we only focus on the features of both statutory and
eﬀective estate taxation that are most important given our purposes.
Federal law imposes an integrated set of taxes on estates, gifts, and gener-
ation skipping transfers. The gross estate includes all of the decedent’s assets.
In the process of going from the gross estate to the net, taxable estate, there
are some of the important steps2:
1. The allowed estate tax implied exemption level was $675,000.
2. Assets are typically evaluated at fair market value. Closely held busi-
ness, however, are allowed to value real property assets at their “use
value” rather than their highest alternative market-oriented value. The
maximum allowed reduction in value was $770,000.
3. In addition, it is often possible to substantially discount asset value when
such assets are not readily marketable or the taxpayers’ ownership does
not correlate with control.
4. Interests in certain qualiﬁed family businesses were also allowed an extra
deduction of up to $ 625,000 in 2000 for the value of the business being
transferred.
2We focus on the characteristics of the 2000 tax code. See Johnson, Mikow, and Britton
Heller [8], and Brownlee [10] for a historic perspective on Federal Estate taxation.
75. One can apply unlimited deductions for transfers to a surviving spouse.
After determining the net estate, that is, the gross estate appropriately
valued less deductions, the statutory tax rate is applied. The “applicable credit
amount” implied that in 2000 at least the ﬁrst $675,000 were not taxable. The
marginal federal tax rate for a taxable returns above that amount was starting
at 37% and topping out at 55%
Credit is given for state inheritance and estate taxes. Most states now levy
“soak-up taxes” that only shift revenues from the federal to the state treasuries
without adding to the total tax burden on the estate.
Just by looking at the simple scheme above, once can see that a rich couple
could immediately double the standard exemption level just by leaving the
children assets up to the deduction upon the death of the ﬁrst decedent, and
then applying the deduction a second time upon death of the other spouse.
Judicious application of valuation schemes and extra deduction for the
presence of a family business further increase the exemption level and brings
down the eﬀective estate tax rate above the exemption level. Schmalbeck [40]
describes many (legal) estate taxes avoidance schemes to reduce the estate tax
burden and provides some measures of eﬀective estate taxes after such schemes
are implemented.
Gale and Slemrod [19] argue that simply by using legal valuation tech-
niques, exemptions, and various deductions, a couple with a $4 million dollar
business could pass it to their heir without paying any estate taxes, and without
having to engage in any complicated tax avoidance scheme. They also argue
that this threshold can be increased even further using other legal schemes.
Britton Eller, Erard, and Ho [33] focus on tax noncompliance by using
audit data. They ﬁnd that overall (illegal) estate tax evasion to be about 13%
8of the potential tax base.
Aaron and Munnell [2] and Kopczuk et al. [28] also argue that there are
many ways to reduce eﬀective estate taxation.
Although many experts agree that eﬀective estate taxation can be sub-
stantially reduced by appropriate estate management and valuation (this can
be done, in part, even after the death of the decedent), there is considerable
uncertainty about how much people can and do reduce the estate tax burden
by using both legal and illegal ways. Wolﬀ [46] and Poterba [35] study this by
comparing tax revenues and the distribution of estates reported in tax forms
with the hypothetical one that would be implied by the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances using mortality probabilities and many other assumptions. While Wolf
argues that the estate tax captures only about 25% of the potential tax base,
Poterba concludes that it catches most of it. Similarly, there is uncertainty
about the eﬀective progressivity of the estate tax and on its exact exemption
level. Some argue that it is easier to decrease the tax burden for smaller es-
tates (which are also less likely to be audited). Others argue that given the
economies of scale for tax avoidance and evasion the tax burden might actually
be lower for larger estates.
There is, in contrast, no dispute about the observed revenues from the
estate and gift tax, and about the fraction of estates that do pay estate taxes.
In terms of revenue, only about 2% of the estates of adult decedents do pay any
estate taxes, and their revenue is about 0.3% of US output (See for example
Gale and Slemrod [19]).
In the process of calibrating our model we propose a complementary and
novel way to assess the burden of estate taxation. We assume a simple form
for estate taxation that allows for an exemption level and a constant tax rate
above such exemption level, and we use our model generated data to match the
9fraction of estates paying estate taxes, and estate tax revenues as a fraction
of output. Interestingly, we ﬁnd numbers that fall well within the bounds
proposed by the previous literature. Given that our model matches asset
holdings so well both for entrepreneurs and workers, and given the considerable
uncertainty about eﬀective estate tax avoidance and evasion, we see this as a
useful way to proceed.
Legislation passed in 2003 has statutory marginal tax rates gradually de-
crease each year, and statutory exemption levels to gradually increase every
year until 2010. In 2010, all estates are be taxed at 0%. In 2011, however, these
temporary cuts are scheduled to vanish, and the statutory taxation schedule
is to revert to much higher levels. Many interpret this path as compelling
evidence that a reform is needed.
3 The model
Since we compute the transition dynamics between the steady states corre-
sponding to a given policy experiment, we make time subscripts explicit when-
ever relevant.
3.1 Demographics
We adopt a life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. To make the
results quantitatively interesting, we need short time periods. To make the
model computationally manageable, we have to keep the number of stages
of life small. To reconcile these two necessities, we adopt a modeling device
introduced by Blanchard [9] and generalized by Gertler [21] to a life-cycle
setting.
10Our model period is one year long. Households go through two stages of
life, young and old age. A young person faces a constant probability of aging
during each period (1 − πy), and an old person faces a constant probability
of dying during each period (1 − πo). When an old person dies, his oﬀspring
enters the model, carrying the assets bequeathed to him by the parent.
Appropriately parameterized, this framework generates households for which
the average length of the working period and the retirement period is realistic.
There is a continuum of households of measure 1.
3.2 Preferences
The household’s ﬂow of utility from consumption is given by
c1−σ
t
1−σ . The house-
holds discount the future at rate β and are perfectly altruistic toward their
descendants.
3.3 Technology
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exogenous,
stochastic, positively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each other.
Entrepreneurial ability (θt) is the capacity to invest capital and labor more or
less productively using one’s own production function. Working ability (yt) is
the capacity to produce income out of labor by working for others.
The entrepreneurs can borrow, invest capital, hire labor, and run a tech-
nology whose return depends on their own entrepreneurial ability: those with
higher ability levels have higher average and marginal returns from capital




t (1 + nt)
(1−γ))
ν + (1 − δ)k
11where ν, γ ∈ [0,1], and n is hired labor (n ≥ 0). We normalize the labor of the
entrepreneur to 1. Entrepreneurs thus face decreasing returns from investment,
as their managerial skills become gradually stretched over larger and larger
projects (as in Lucas (1978)). While entrepreneurial ability is exogenously
given, the entrepreneurial rate of return from investing in capital is endogenous
and is a function of the size of the project that the entrepreneur implements.
There is no within-period uncertainty regarding the returns of the en-
trepreneurial project. The ability θt is observable and known by all at the
beginning of the period. We therefore abstract from problems arising from
partial observability, costly state veriﬁcation, and from diversiﬁcation of en-
trepreneurial risk.
Workers can save (but not borrow) at a riskless, constant rate of return.
Many ﬁrms are not controlled by a single entrepreneur and are not likely
to face the same ﬁnancing restrictions that we stress in our model. There-
fore, as in Quadrini (2000), we model two sectors of production: one popu-
lated by the entrepreneurs and one by “non-entrepreneurial” ﬁrms. The non-















t are the total capital and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial
sector and A is a constant. In both sectors, capital depreciates at a rate δ.
3.4 Credit market constraints
As in Marcet and Marimon [32], Kehoe and Levine [26], Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn[3], Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini [15], and Cagetti and De Nardi [11],
the borrowing constraints are endogenously determined in equilibrium and
12stem from the assumptions that contracts are imperfectly enforceable.
Imperfect enforceability of contracts means that the creditors will not be
able to force the debtors to fully repay their debts as promised, but that the
debtors fully repay only if it is in their own interest to do so. Since both
parties are aware of this feature and act rationally, the lender will lend to a
given borrower an amount (possibly zero) that will be in the debtor’s interest
to repay as promised.
In particular, we assume that the entrepreneurs who borrow either can
invest the money and repay their debt at the end of the period or can run
away without investing it and be workers for one period. In the latter case,
they retain a fraction f of their working capital kt (which includes own assets
and borrowed money) and their creditors seize the rest. We assume that
labor services are paid at the end of the period, hence entrepreneurs are not
contrained in the amount of labor that they hire.
In the absence of market imperfections, the optimal level of capital is
only related to technological parameters and does not depend on initial as-
sets. In our framework, instead, the higher the amount of the entrepreneur’s
own wealth invested in the business, the larger the amount that the borrower
would lose in case of default. Hence, the lower the incentive to default, and the
larger the sum that the creditor is willing to lend to the entrepreneur. Hence,
the entrepreneur’s assets act as collateral, but the loan is not necessarily fully
collateralized.
As a result, not all potentially proﬁtable projects receive appropriate fund-
ing. Households with little wealth can borrow little, even if they have high
ability as entrepreneurs. Since the entrepreneur forgoes his potential earnings
as a worker, he will choose to become an entrepreneur only if the size of the
ﬁrm that he can start is big enough, that is, if he is rich enough to be able to
13borrow and invest a suitable amount of money in his ﬁrm.
3.5 Government and taxation
The government is inﬁnitely lived. It levies taxes, pays a pension pt to each
retiree, provides a certain level gt of public purchases (which do not enter
the households’ utility function), and pays interest on the accumulated debt.
During every period, tax revenues from income, consumption, and estate taxes
are equal to government purchases, pension payments, and interest payments
on the debt.
We model progressive taxation of total income (as in Altig and Carl-
strom [5]), and we allow the tax schedules to be diﬀerent for entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs (including workers and retirees). We adopt Gouveia
and Strauss’ [23] functional form and assume the average federal tax rate










where i = e,w: entrepreneurs and workers. Gouveia and Strauss [23] have
shown that this functional form is ﬂexible enough to approximate well the
eﬀective average tax rate. As explained in the calibration section, we esti-
mate the parameters bi, si, and pi from microeconomic data, separately for
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.








t captures state and other income taxes (other than federal). The
14government also levies a sales tax on consumption, at rate τc
t . Estates larger
than a given value et are taxed at rate τb
t on the amount in excess of et. The
tax rates τs
t , τc
t , and τb
t are potentially time-varying, depending on the policy
experiment under consideration.
3.6 Households
At the beginning of each period the current ability levels are known with
certainty, while next period’s levels are uncertain. Each young individual starts
the period with assets at, entrepreneurial ability θt, and worker ability yt and
chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker during the current period.
An old entrepreneur can decide to keep the activity going or retire, while
a retiree cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity.
The young’s problem







t (at,yt,θt) is the value function of a young individual who manages
an entrepreneurial activity during the current period. The term V w
t (at,yt,θt)
is the value function if he chooses to be a worker during the current period.
The young entrepreneur’s problem can be written as
V
e
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at ≥ 0 (6)
nt ≥ 0 (7)
kt ≥ 0. (8)
The term Y e
t represents the entrepreneur’s total proﬁts. The expected
value of the value function is taken with respect to (yt+1,θt+1), conditional on
(yt,θt). Eq. (5) determines the maximum amount that an entrepreneur with
given state variables can borrow. The term Wt(at+1,θt+1) is the value function
of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, before deciding whether
to stay in business or retire. We have
V
w






subject to eq. (6) and
Y
w
t = ¯ wt yt + ¯ rt at (10)




t ) − (1 + τ
c
t )ct, (11)
where ¯ wt is the equilibrium wage rate.
16The old’s problem
Since the old entrepreneur can choose to continue the entrepreneurial activity
or retire, his state variables are his current assets at and his entrepreneurial







t (at,θt) is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in
business, and W r
t (at) is the value function of the old retired person. Deﬁne the
inherited assets, net of estate taxes, as an











subject to eq. (3), eq. (4), eq. (6), eq. (7), eq. (8) and




t (f · kt).
(14)
The child of an entrepreneur is born with ability level (θt+1,yt+1). The expected
value of the child’s value function with respect to yt+1 is computed using the
invariant distribution of yt, while the one with respect to θt+1 is conditional
on the parent’s θt and evolves according to the same Markov process that each
person faces for θt while alive. This is justiﬁed by the assumption that the
child of an entrepreneur inherits the parent’s ﬁrm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social
17security payments (pt) and consumes his assets. His value function is
W
r







subject to eq. (6) and
at+1 = (1 + ¯ rt)at + pt − T
w
t (pt + ¯ rtat) − (1 + τ
c
t )ct. (16)
The expected value of the child’s value function is taken with respect to the
invariant distribution of yt and θt.
3.7 Equilibrium deﬁnition
Let xt = (at,yt,θt,st) be the state vector, where s distinguishes young workers,
young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retired. From the decision
rules that solve the maximization problem and the exogenous Markov process
for income and entrepreneurial ability, we can derive a transition function
Mt(xt,·), which provides the probability distribution of xt+1 (the state next
period) conditional on the current state xt.
An equilibrium is given by the following functions

        
        
a risk free interest rate ¯ rt and wage rate ¯ wt,
taxes (T w
t (.), T e
t (.),τc
t , τb
t , et) and social security payments pt,
allocations ct(x), and at(x), occupational choices,
entrepreneurial labor hiring nt(x), and investments kt(x),
and a distribution of people over the state variables xt: mt(x),
such that, given ¯ rt, ¯ wt, and government taxes and transfer schedules:
18• The functions ct, at, nt and kt solve the maximization problems described
above.
• The capital and labor markets clear. Total labor supplied by the work-
ers equals the total labor employed in the non-entrepreneurial sector
and total labor hired by the entrepreneurs. Total household savings in
the economy equal the sum of the total capital employed in the non-
entrepreneurial and entrepreneurial sectors plus government debt.
• The marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital (net
of depreciation) in the non-entrepreneurial sector are equal to ¯ wt and ¯ rt.
• The government budget constraint balances at every period: total taxes









t (1−πo)·max(0,at+1(xt)−et))dmt(x) = ptπr+gt+¯ rtDt.
The integral is over all of the population, Io is an indicator function that
is equal to one if the person is old and zero otherwise, and πr is the
fraction of retired people in the population. In steady state Dt = ¯ D.







In steady state mt = m∗ is the invariant distribution for the economy and
debt, prices, and government policies are constant and the individual’s
decision rules are time-independent.
193.8 The transition path between steady states
Our economy starts from an initial steady state in which there is estate tax-
ation. Unexpectedly, the government abolishes estate taxes and makes up for
the shortfall of government revenues by changing one of the following three
instruments:
1. government spending,
2. the consumption tax,
3. the proportional part of the tax on total income.
When we use either the income or the consumption tax, we allow the
government to adjust this policy instrument for ten years, and after this period
the tax is set at its ﬁnal steady state level. The level of the tax during these
years is determined by the requirement that the government budget constraint
has to be satisﬁed in present value. The shape of the tax change over this time
period is constrained to be piecewise linear over two ﬁve-years subperiods.
That is, during these ten years the government could, for example, raise the
chosen tax instrument for ﬁve years, and then lower it down to its ﬁnal steady
state value for other ﬁve years. In these experiments government expenditure
is kept ﬁxed as a fraction of total output both during the transition and in the
ﬁnal steady state.
For all ﬁnal steady states we set government debt to be the same constant
fraction of total output as in the initial steady state.
When we change government spending as a result of the abolition of the
estate tax, we keep all other tax rates ﬁxed at their initial steady state value,
and we take government debt to be a constant fraction of output also during
20the transition path. Budget balance for the government then implies how much
government expenditure is.
As soon as people learn about the new policy, the households reoptimize
their behavior taking as given the new path of government policy and prices.
Barring any other changes, the economy will eventually settle down on a ﬁnal
steady state as a result of the new tax code (the ﬁnal steady state). During
the intervening years, the economy will be in a transition.
The transition will take longer than the period over which taxes change
because the distribution of people over state variables will take a while to
reach its steady state level, and because of general equilibrium eﬀects (the
prices will take a while to get close to their steady state levels).
4 Calibration
Tables 1 and 2 list the parameters of the model. Table 1 lists the parameters
that we take as given and do not use to match model-generated moments with
moments in the data. Table 2 lists the parameters of the model that we choose
so that the data generated by the initial steady state of the model matches
some relevant counterpart of the observed data.
Regarding the ﬁrst set of parameters, we take the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion to be 1.5, a value close to those estimated, among others, by
Attanasio et al. [6]. As is standard in the business cycle literature, we choose
a depreciation rate δ of 6% and the capital share in the non-entrepreneurial
production function of .33. The probability of aging and of death are such
that the average length of the working life is 45 years and the average length
of the retirement period is 11 years. This implies that the fraction of young
people in the population is about 80%. The logarithm of the income y process
21for working people is assumed to follow an AR(1). We take its persistence to
be .95, as estimated, for instance, by Storesletten et al. [44]. The variance is
chosen to match the Gini coeﬃcient for earnings of .38, the average found in
the PSID. We assume that the income process and the entrepreneurial ability
processes evolve independently; the exact values for the income and ability
processes are described in Appendix A. The social security replacement rate
is 40% of average gross income. (see Kotlikoﬀ et al. [29].)
The average of the ratio between government purchases and GDP over
1990-99 was 18.7% (Economic Report of the President, 2000).
As in Altig et al. [4], we take the tax rate on consumption to be 11%. The
ratio of total indirect taxes to personal consumption expenditure in the NIPA
accounts has been quite stable around 11%-12% from 1989 to 1999.
We pick the level of government debt (as a fraction of output) so that,
given the equilibrium interest rate, every period the total interest payments
on government debt equal 3% of output (as in Altig et al. [4]).
We estimate the parameters of the tax function on total income using PSID
data for 1989. See Appendix B for details. Figure 1 displays our estimated
average tax rates as a function of total income for the whole population and
for the subpopulations of entrepreneurs and workers.
In previous work (Cagetti and De Nardi [11]) we have discussed the relevant
empirical counterpart to the entrepreneur in our model. We have argued that
our entrepreneurs are the self-employed business owners that actively manage
their own ﬁrm(s). We identify them in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
with those that declare that they are self-employed, that they own a business,
and that they actively manage it.
Table 2 lists the remaining parameters of the model and their correspond-
ing values in the baseline calibration. We consider only two values of en-
22Parameter Value Source(s)
Preferences, technology, and demographics
σ 1.5 Attanasio et al. [6]
δ .06 Stokey and Rebelo [43]
α .33 Gollin [22]
A 1 normalization
πy .98 average working life: 45 years
πo .91 average retirement life: 11 years
Labor income process and social security payments
y,Py see appendix A Huggett [25], Lillard et al. [31]
p 40% average yearly income Kotlikoﬀ et al. [29]
Public expenditure, government debt, and taxes
g 18.7% GDP NIPA
D see text Altig et al. [4]
τc 11% Altig et al. [4]
bw .32 our estimates
be .26 our estimates
sw .22 our estimates
pw .76 our estimates
pe 1.4 our estimates
se .42 our estimates
Table 1: Fixed parameters and their sources.





























Figure 1: Estimated average tax rates for the whole population, workers, and
entrepreneurs.
trepreneurial ability: zero (no entrepreneurial ability) and a positive number.
This implies that Pθ is a two-by-two matrix. Since its rows have to sum to
one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate. We also have to choose values
for ν, the degree of decreasing returns to scale to entrepreneurial ability, γ,
the share of income going to entrepreneurial working capital, f, the fraction of
working capital the entrepreneur can keep in case he defaults, the estate tax
rate, and its corresponding exemption level.
In total, these are nine parameters to be used to match nine moments of
the data. We use the ﬁrst seven to target the following moments generated by
the model: the capital-output ratio (3.0), the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
population (7.6 percent), the fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneur-
ship during each period (22%), the fraction of workers becoming entrepreneurs
during each period (2.5%), the ratio of median net worth of entrepreneurs to
that of workers (7), the fraction of people with zero wealth (7-13%), the frac-
tion of entrepreneurs hiring workers on the labor market (60%). We choose the
other two parameters to match the revenue from estate and gift taxes (0.3%











Table 2: Calibrated parameters.
calibration matches all of these targets well.
While our calibrated share of income that goes to entrepreneurial working
capital might appear high compared to the one that people use in the aggregate
economy (.33-0.40), it should be noted that this high number is necessary to
match the empirical observation that 40% of entrepreneurs hire no labor on
the market.
5 Results: evaluating our model generated data
against the actual data.
We now compare some important features of the actual data for the U.S.
economy with the corresponding features of our model-generated data. A good
ﬁt of the model to aspects of the data that were not matched by construction in
our calibration procedure increases our faith in the policy projections generated
by the model.
255.1 Wealth distribution
Table 3 compares some data for the U.S. economy (from the 1989 SCF, the
data from other years are similar) and for the model-generated data, and
Figures 2 and 3 compare the wealth distribution for the same U.S. data and
for the model, respectively, for the whole population and for the subpopulation
of entrepreneurs.
Our framework with entrepreneurial choice ﬁts the observed wealth distri-
bution very well, both for the whole population, and for the subpopulation of
the entrepreneurs. See Cagetti and De Nardi [11] for a discussion on the role
of entrepreneurship in shaping wealth concentration, on the relationship be-
tween borrowing constraints and entrepreneurial entry, and on entrepreneurial
returns.





























Figure 2: Distribution of wealth
for the whole population. Dash-
dot line: data; solid line: baseline
model.

























Figure 3: Distribution of the en-
trepreneurs’ wealth. Dash-dot line:
data; solid line: baseline model.
26Percentage wealth in the top
Wealth
Gini 1% 5% 20% 40%
U.S. data .78 30 54 81 95
Model .82 30 60 85 95
Table 3: Baseline calibration.
5.2 Wealth mobility
To evaluate the policy implications of the model it is also important to evaluate
whether the dynamics of the model are consistent with those in the observed
data. Given that wealth is our main interest, we evaluate here the wealth
dynamics of the model.
Unfortunately the SCF, which is the data set speciﬁcally designed to study
wealth and the behavior of the wealthy (see Cagetti and De Nardi [12] for
a discussion on this point) does not have a panel dimension. Hence, it can-
not be used to study wealth dynamics at the household level. We therefore
use data from the wealth supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), which does have a panel dimension, and also asks questions that al-
low us to distinguish the self-employed business owners from the workers. The
PSID wealth supplement is available every ﬁve years. We report the transi-
tion dynamics for the 1989-1995 period (the results from the other years look
similar).
To understand the relationship between mobility and occupational choice,
we follow the same approach followed by Quadrini ( [36] and [37]). We compute
net worth terciles for the whole population of both self-employed business own-
ers and workers. We divide the population according to occupational mobility
27as follows: workers that remain workers, workers that become entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurs that remain entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs that switch to be-
ing workers. For each of these subcategories we compute wealth mobility across
net worth terciles.
Table 4 reports both the results and the number of observations corre-
sponding to each cell. We can see that in our sample the total number of
workers that remain workers is 2214, the total number of workers that switch
to being entrepreneurs is 75, the total number of entrepreneurs that switch to
being workers is 49, and the number of entrepreneurs that stay entrepreneurs
is 206. These numbers are important because they highlight how some of the
transition matrices are based on a small number of observations and should
therefore be taken with caution.
This said, the transition matrices indicate more wealth upward mobility
for the entrepreneurs that stay entrepreneurs than for the workers that stay
workers. Although the mobility matrices oﬀ the main diagonal (workers to en-
trepreneurs and entrepreneurs to workers) are based on a very small a sample
size, they seem to broadly indicate that the workers that become entrepreneurs
are more upwardly mobile than those that remain workers, and that the en-
trepreneurs that switch to being workers are more downward mobile than those
that remain entrepreneurs.
We compute the analogous occupation and wealth mobility transition ma-
trix generated by our model (also over a ﬁve year period). The results are in
table 5. The transition matrices estimated using our model include all of the
population, and therefore do not have a small sample problem.
Table 5 shows that our model matches extremely well the wealth transitions
of the workers to workers (the one for which the PSID has more observations),
and that also matches quite well the important patterns of the PSID data that
28Staying workers Switching workers
0.79 0.18 0.03 0.47 0.44 0.08
0.21 0.64 0.15 0.04 0.42 0.54
0.02 0.23 0.75 0.00 0.23 0.77
number of observations for each cell
661 148 29 17 16 3
163 507 115 1 11 14
16 135 440 0 3 10
Switching entrepreneurs Staying entrepreneurs
0.75 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.17
0.20 0.70 0.10 0.21 0.51 0.28
0.06 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.07 0.91
number of observations for each cell
6 2 0 6 4 2
2 7 1 9 22 12
2 9 20 3 10 138
Table 4: Wealth mobility: data from the PSID 1989 to 1994.
we have discussed above, such as more upward mobility for the entrepreneurs,
and for the workers that become entrepreneurs.
5.3 Consumption inequality
Table 6 reports data from the consumption distribution in the United States3
and in our benchmark model economy. The ﬁrst row displays the U.S. distri-
bution of consumption of non-durable goods, while the second row reports the
U.S. distribution of consumption of non-durable goods plus imputed services
of consumer durables. These two lines show that these distributions are very
3Data from the 1991 wave of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Computations
by Casta˜ neda et al. [13].
29Staying workers Switching workers
0.76 0.23 0.01 0.16 0.60 0.24
0.22 0.58 0.20 0.01 0.28 0.71
0.00 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.99
Switching entrepreneurs Staying entrepreneurs
0.38 0.45 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.83
0.08 0.42 0.50 0.02 0.08 0.92
0 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.99
Table 5: Wealth mobility: model.
Top groups
Economy 1% 5% 10%
US (ND+) 4% 14% 24%
US (ND) 5% 15% 25%
Benchmark (C96) 5% 18% 29%
Benchmark (C99) 8% 26% 38%
Benchmark 16% 36% 46%
Table 6: Consumption distribution: data and model.
similar.
The third and fourth row of table 6 report the same statistics for the
data generated by our benchmark economy when we respectively eliminate
the wealthiest 4% and 1% of the model economy households from the sample,
while the last row displays the consumption statistics for the whole sample.
The large diﬀerences in these distributions highlight the extreme sensi-
tivity of the inequality statistics to the lack of oversampling of the richest
households and to the amount of top-coding (a point discussed by Davies and
Shorrocks [16] in the context of the wealth distribution). Consumption is mea-
30sured with signiﬁcant measurement error even in the CEX, which is the best
data set for household-level consumption for the United States. For exam-
ple, if one aggregates the consumption CEX data, the CEX underestimates
consumption by 35% compared to National Income and Products Accounts
(NIPA). On these points see Slesnick [42], and more recently, Attanasio, Bat-
tistin and Ichimura [7].
Given the problems with the consumption data sets, and given how well
a mismeasured consumption distribution from our model ﬁts the data, we
consider this check as additional evidence of the validity of our model and its
calibration.
6 Abolishing estate taxation
For each policy we ﬁrst discuss the long-run outcomes, we then describe the
transition path to the new steady state, and we ﬁnally analyze the welfare
costs and beneﬁts.
The welfare costs and beneﬁts are expressed in terms of the fraction of
consumption needed to have someone indiﬀerent between the new and the old
tax system, taking the whole transition path into account. Positive numbers
indicate gains from the tax reform. The horizontal axis represents one’s net
worth at the moment the reform is announced. The solid line is the cumulative
distribution of either young or old people people at the time of the announce-
ment of the reform. The scale for this variable is on the right-hand side of the
graph. The other two lines display the welfare gain or loss for a person with
the middle ability level as a worker and, respectively, the lowest ability level as
an entrepreneur (dashed line) and the highest ability level as an entrepreneur
(dash-dot line). For all policy experiments, the welfare costs and beneﬁts for
31workers of other ability levels are very similar to the ones that reported.
K Y Interest Perc. Perc. wealth held by top
rate Entr. 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark economy
9.02 3.00 3.33% 7.6 29.5 59.5 73.6 85.4
No estate tax, lower g
+2.4% +1.3% 3.14% 7.6 30.5 60.6 74.2 85.8
No estate tax, higher τc
+2.7% +1.4% 3.12% 7.6 30.5 60.6 74.2 85.8
No estate tax, higher τs
+.8% +0.1% 3.22% 7.6 30.4 60.3 74.0 85.7
Table 7: Abolishing the estate tax and adjusting another policy instrument,
comparing initial and ﬁnal steady states.
6.1 Abolishing estate taxation and adjusting govern-
ment purchases
Government purchases are unproductive in this framework. It is therefore
unsurprising that in the model economy (see Table 7, line 2) cutting the estate
tax at the expense of government purchases raises total output (by 1.3%)
and capital (by 2.4%). The interesting ﬁnding here is that this eﬀects are
substantial when compared to the small revenue coming from the estate tax.
The elimination of the estate tax increases output by a factor of four times
the revenue raised by the estate tax, and raises capital by at least a factor
of eight. Abolishing estate taxation beneﬁts the newborn entrepreneurs, who
inherit larger estates and can run larger ﬁrms and make money more quickly
as a result. More funds in the economy are thus invested in the more produc-
32Perc. consumption by top
1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark economy
16.1 35.5 46.1 59.4
No estate tax, lower g
16.7 36.1 46.6 59.7
No estate tax, higher τc
16.7 32.6 46.7 59.8
No estate tax, higher τs
16.5 35.9 46.3 59.6
Table 8: Abolishing the estate tax and adjusting another policy instrument,
consumption distributions, comparing initial and ﬁnal steady states.
tive technology, the entrepreneurial one. This increase in investment is further
ampliﬁed by the reduction in the interest rate, which represents the opportu-
nity cost of funds for the entrepreneurs. This price change beneﬁts all of the
entrepreneurs.
Despite the resulting increases in investment, capital, and output, the gov-
ernment revenues from consumption and income taxes are not enough to make
up from the shortfall in government revenues due to the abolition of the es-
tate tax, and the government has to cut government purchases as a fraction
of output as a result. However, while the revenue from estate taxes in initial
steady state is 0.3% of output, the government has to cut spending only by
0.05% as a fraction of output (with respect to the initial steady state) because
of the increase in output (and thus tax revenues) generated by the abolition
of estate taxes.
Another interesting ﬁnding from this experiment is that abolishing estate
taxation changes long-run consumption and wealth inequality very little. Ta-
33ble 8 reports the consumption distributions.














Figure 4: Total capital over time after eliminating estate taxes and reducing
government spending.
Figure 4 plots the path of total capital in the economy starting from the
initial steady state and transiting to the ﬁnal steady state of the economy.
When the estate tax is eliminated and government spending is cut accordingly,
total capital increases for about 50 years. Aggregate output follows a very
similar path.
Figures 5 and 6 display the welfare gains and losses (expressed as a fraction
of yearly consumption) from switching to the economy with no estate taxes
and reduced government spending.
The solid line represents the cumulative distribution of either the young
or the old people at the time of the reform. This line, together with the
consumption compensation lines, shows that almost 80% of the young and
over 90% of the old beneﬁt from this reform. The young make up for 80% of
the population.
Who gains from this reform? The largest gains are experienced by the old,
and especially by the rich among them, but people in the lower-middle class
(deﬁned as having net worth below half a million dollar) also beneﬁt.
34Those that are very rich, and especially the old among them, beneﬁt from
the break in estate taxation. The immensely rich old experience a consumption
gain of 7%, while the gain of their young counterparts is less than 1%. This
is because the old are much closer to the time of their demise, and thus value
the estate tax break more. (The scales at the left of each of the two graphs
refer to the consumption compensation.)
Those whose net worth is below half a million dollars gain because of the
increase in wages resulting from more aggregate capital accumulation. For
them, wage income makes up for most of total income.
The losers are the young that are not poor enough and not rich enough:
those whose net worth is above half a million dollar, but below ten or twenty
(depending on their entrepreneurial ability level). This is because capital in-
come makes up for a large share of their total income, and the interest rate
drops as a result of this reform.
Similarly, the old with low entrepreneurial ability and assets above 1 million
dollar, but below 7 million dollar, are hurt by the decrease in the interest rate.
They also do not beneﬁt from the estate tax break, given that they were below
the exemption level, or close to it, before the reform took place.
The average welfare gain from this reform is of the order of 0.2% of yearly
consumption.
6.2 Abolishing estate taxation while adjusting the con-
sumption tax
The consumption tax hike needed to make up from the shortfall in revenues
in the ﬁnal steady state is small: this tax increases from 11% to 11.3%.
Tables 7 and 8 show that the long-run eﬀects of this reform are very similar

















































































Figure 5: Welfare gains of elim-
inating estate taxes and reducing
government spending for the initial
young.









































































Figure 6: Welfare gains of elim-
inating estate taxes and reducing
government spending for the initial
old.
to the ones in the reform in which government spending is cut. Capital and
output increase by similar amounts and wealth and consumption inequality
change little. The fraction of entrepreneurs also remains unchanged.
Figure 7 plots the implied path of the tax rate on consumption over time.
During the transition period the consumption tax peaks at 11.5% before de-
clining to its ﬁnal steady state level of 11.3%. Figure 3 highlights that capital
overshoots its ﬁnal steady state level a little bit during the transition, but that
50 years after the policy reform has taken place the majority of the transition
in capital accumulation has occurred. Aggregate output behaves similarly to
aggregate capital.
Figures 9 and 10 report the consumption compensations for this reform.
Even the largest losses are smaller than 1% of yearly consumption. Nonethe-
less, most people lose from switching to this tax system: they are not rich
enough to beneﬁt from the estate tax break, and they have to pay higher con-
sumption taxes. A young person has to own at least ﬁfteen to twenty million
dollars (depending on their entrepreneurial ability) to beneﬁt from the tax re-























Figure 7: Consumption tax over
time when eliminating estate taxes
and increasing consumption taxes.















Figure 8: Total capital over time
when of eliminating estate taxes
and increasing consumption taxes.
form, and even for the very richest young people the beneﬁts are small. Many
of the elderly are also hurt by the reform, given that they must hold four to ten
million dollar (depending on the ability level) to beneﬁt from the tax reform.
The beneﬁts for the very rich, however, are signiﬁcant: on the order of almost
7% of yearly consumption.
The average welfare cost from this reform is of the order of 0.3% of con-
sumption.
6.3 Abolishing estate taxation while adjusting the pro-
portional income tax
To balance the government budget constraint, the proportional part of the
income tax increases from 3.6% to 4.0%. This change aﬀects all of the house-
holds in the economy and, in particular, decreases the return (net of taxes)
from investing in capital for the entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs hit more
harshly by this tax increase are most of the young ones (for which the expected

















































































Figure 9: Welfare gains for the
initial young of eliminating estate
taxes and increasing consumption
taxes.









































































Figure 10: Welfare gains for the ini-
tial old of eliminating estate taxes
and increasing consumption taxes.
time of death is still far in the future, and thus the beneﬁts from the elimina-
tion of the estate tax are small) and the old ones who are not rich enough to
really beneﬁt from the abolition of the estate tax. As a result, there is only a
very small increase in output with respect to the initial steady state, and the
aggregate gains are much smaller compared to the ones in the previous two
reforms.
The long-run eﬀects of this policy on consumption and wealth inequality
are very modest as in the other policies that we have considered.
Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull [13] analyze the eﬀects of a similar
reform in a model with no entrepreneurial choice, in which the key force driving
wealth inequality is that the rich are subject to very large idiosyncratic earnings
shocks (which are calibrated to match inequality in wealth holdings). As in
our model, they ﬁnd that the abolition of the estate tax generates only a
small increase in wealth inequality. Compared to us, they obtain a long-run
aggregate increase of 0.4% for output, which is four times larger than what
we obtain, and a somewhat larger eﬀect on total capital accumulation (0.87%
38compared to 0.78%). The additional channel at work in our framework is the
disincentive eﬀect on entrepreneurial investment due to the higher income tax.
Since in our framework the entrepreneurial technology is much more productive
than the non-entrepreneurial one, smaller investment by the entrepreneurs
results in much lower aggregate income than smaller investment by the workers.
Laitner [30] also studies the eﬀects of a similar reform. He adopts a more
stylized economy in which some household are altruistic while others do not
care about their descendants. His main message is that, in his framework,
abolishing the estate tax generates a signiﬁcant increase in the share of total
net worth held by the richest 1%, while the eﬀects on the aggregates are
relatively small for most parameterizations, but can be positive or negative
depending on the fraction of altruistic households.
In our framework the consumption compensations required by this reform
are similar to the ones that we reported when the consumption tax is raised.
As in that policy, increasing the income tax to make up from lost revenues
from the estate tax implies small welfare losses for most of the population.
The average welfare cost for this reform is of the same order of magnitude
than when the consumption tax is raised.
In sum, we ﬁnd that eliminating the estate tax while increasing the tax on
total income would generate a small increase on aggregate capital but would
have negligible eﬀects on aggregate output. This reform would slightly increase
wealth inequality, and would redistribute from the young to the old and from
most people to a tiny fraction of rich people, thus generating welfare losses for
the most of the population.
397 Conclusions
Our model suggests that eliminating the estate tax would not generate large
increases in wealth and consumption inequality, and increases in aggregate
output and capital accumulation.
Unfortunately, these reforms would also imply welfare losses to the vast
majority of the population, and beneﬁt only the very rich and, in particular,
the old among the very rich.
This happens despite the fact that our framework models explicitly en-
trepreneurial activity and borrowing constraints, which seem to be the key
features that the proponent of abolishing estate taxation are most concerned
about.
There are features of reality that could provide additional reasons to abolish
estate taxation. For example, our model does not consider tax avoidance costs.
Signiﬁcant amounts of resources might be spent to decrease the tax burden,
through the use of lawyers and accountants. The cost of tax avoidance might
generate a deadweight loss that should be considered in the overall evaluation
of any change in the estate tax. (See Aaron and Munnell [2] and Schmalbeck
[40] for a discussion of the avoidance costs.) This is an important and to a
large extent unexplored issue that we leave for future research.
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43A Income and entrepreneurial ability
We assume that the income process is AR(1) and approximate it with a ﬁve-
point discrete Markov chain, using the method described in Tauchen and
Hussey [45]. The gridpoints y for the income process (normalized to 1) that
we use are
 
0.2468 0.4473 0.7654 1.3097 2.3742
 
and the transition matrix Py is

        

0.7376 0.2473 0.0150 0.0002 0.0000
0.1947 0.5555 0.2328 0.0169 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0169 0.2328 0.5555 0.1947
0.0000 0.0002 0.0150 0.2473 0.7376

        

.






B Federal tax schedules
We estimate equation (1) using nonlinear least squares. The data are for 1989
and are taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We use the
PSID dataset for this part of our analysis because it asks questions that allow
us to classify households as entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and, until
1989, it also provides computed data on total taxes paid by the respondents.













Table 9: Estimates for the federal average tax rates.
Our measure of total monetary income includes all forms of labor income,
capital income, transfers, and income from entrepreneurial activities. Total
federal taxes paid is the variable computed in the PSID (in our case, V18862
in the 1990 ﬁle). The dependent variable in the regression, average tax rate,
is the ratio of federal taxes paid to total monetary income.
To obtain a representative sample, we exclude the poverty and Latino sam-
ples. To obtain the appropriate tax rate for our model (in which the lowest
income level is positive), we also drop all observations with income smaller
than $1,000 or negative taxes paid.
To make the data on entrepreneurs consistent with those that we use from
the SCF data set and the model we employ, we deﬁne as entrepreneurs those
who declare to be self-employed and own or have a ﬁnancial interest in a busi-
45ness activity and had an income of at least $1,000 from running the business
during the period. The resulting sample of entrepreneurs has very similar char-
acteristics to those from the SCF. Our estimates would be very similar if we
were to assume a somewhat smaller or larger cutoﬀ for the amount of business
income received during the period.
We perform the estimation on three samples: the whole population of
households, including workers and entrepreneurs, the subpopulation of workers
only, and the subpopulation of entrepreneurs only. The estimated values for
the three groups are shown in Table 9 and plotted in Figure 1.
46